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Managing Housing Bubbles in Regional Economies under  
EMU: Ireland and Spain 
 
1. Introduction 1 
 
Over the last thirty years the housing market has been a source of significant 
economic instability on at least one occasion in each of a wide range of OECD 
economies. When housing bubbles have burst they have caused substantial damage to 
the affected economy. As a result, they ought to be a cause for concern for economic 
policy makers. On some occasions when housing bubbles have burst they have also 
been associated with significant disruption to the domestic financial system (e.g. in 
the mid-west of the US in the mid 1980s, in Scandinavia in  1989/1990 and today in 
the US, Spain and Ireland). Any such financial sector disruption greatly magnifies the 
macro-economic disruption which is caused by a housing sector collapse (Honohan 
and Klingebiel, 2003). 
The analysis carried out in Girouard et al. (2006), indicates that when housing 
bubbles have occurred in the past they were essentially idiosyncratic in nature – they 
generally did not occur simultaneously across major regions of the OECD. The 
analysis in Himmelberg et al. (2005) also indicates that prior to the recent crisis there 
has not been a “US housing bubble” but rather a series of local bubbles in individual 
cities or regions in the US at different times over the last quarter of a century. 
Until the current crisis there was little evidence that housing bubbles had become 
any more frequent over time and it is also interesting that, even with monetary union 
in the US, there had not, until now, been any obvious tendency for a “convergence” of 
bubbles within the US, much less in the EU. However, Girouard et al. (2006) suggest 
that global factors were important in continuing the housing boom across quite a 
number of markets in the period up to 2006 and this may explain why today there are 
                                                 
 
1 This paper was prepared as part of an IRCHSS-funded project “Turning Globalization to National 
Advantage: Economic Policy Lessons from Ireland's Experience”. It has benefited from comments 
from colleagues, especially Ide Kearney and David Duffy, from Philip Lane of TCD, as well as 
participants at the June 2009 EUROFRAME conference in London and participants at a meeting of 
National Economic Research Organisations, OECD, Paris, September, 2009. 
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housing market crises in an unusually large number of EU members as well as in the 
US. 
This idiosyncratic pattern reflects the fact that the drivers of housing prices are 
varied in nature and they include significant local or regional variables. Himmelberg 
et al. (2005) refer to the role of “superstar cities” where local circumstances can result 
in a prolonged period of higher than average growth in house prices.  
The evidence suggests that until recently housing markets in the Euro area 
mirrored the pattern in the US, with some national markets showing very rapid 
inflation in asset values and others showing no inflation at all. While there is today 
some synchronisation across certain EMU members in their housing cycles, there is 
still very considerable diversity across the EMU. For example, in Ireland and Spain 
there is currently a major down turn in the housing market while in Germany and 
Finland there is no evidence of any major reduction in housing prices or output. 
While housing market crashes in individual economies have generally not had 
global implications they have had very severe repercussions domestically. This is the 
case today in Ireland and Spain. It is important to understand what drives these 
housing markets so that future bubbles might be avoided. Because of the serious 
damage that housing crashes can cause to individual economies it will be important in 
the future to develop policy instruments to manage housing markets and to prevent 
dangerous bubbles occurring. While monetary policy is not a suitable instrument 
within EMU for this purpose because of the idiosyncratic nature of housing markets, 
this paper argues that fiscal policy instruments can achieve the desired impact if used 
in an innovative fashion. 
In Section 2 of this paper the demographic factors that underpin long-term demand 
for housing are considered with particular reference to Ireland and Spain. This paper 
goes on in Section 3 to set out a simple model of the housing markets in Ireland and 
Spain. In the context of these models Section 4  considers how the advent of EMU has 
changed the cost of capital facing households and how this has affected the experience 
of Ireland and Spain in the current decade. Section 5 discusses the significance of the 
building sector in these two economies, an important factor in determining the macro-
economic impact of a housing price crash. Section 6 discusses the implications of this 
experience for how housing markets should be managed in the future in EMU. 
Monetary policy, as implemented by the ECB, cannot be targeted at preventing 
dangerous situations arising in any individual regional housing market. The problem 
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that this poses for members of EMU is discussed, together with the appropriate fiscal 
strategy for managing potential regional bubbles. Section 7 presents conclusions. 
2. The Drivers of the Housing Market – Demographics 
 
The desired stock of housing in the long run in any economy is a function of 
permanent income, the user cost of housing, the cost of building, the availability of 
credit, local factors, and, crucially, the demographic structure. Because houses 
typically have very long lives and because demographic circumstances in individual 
economies change slowly the new build each year is typically a small proportion of 
the actual stock of dwellings. While the legacy effects of the destruction caused by the 
Second World War required major investment in the 1950s and 1960s, in many 
European countries this reconstruction work is long since completed. However, there 
may be issues for the new EU 12 member states related to the legacy effects of a half 
a century under communist rule. Today there are still significant differences in 
demography across the EU-15 which imply there will be regional differences in the 
demand for housing in the long-term.  
 
Table 1:  Dwellings per 1000 adults, 2001 
 Total dwellings Occupied dwellings 
Denmark 621 595 
Estonia 599 521 
France 634 526 
Germany 599  
Hungary 519 475 
Ireland 
2002 525 464 
Ireland 
2006 574 478 
Netherlands  534 
Poland 454 421 
Portugal 634 448 
Spain 655 444 
UK 575 551 
 
Source: EUROSTAT file cens_rdhh for dwellings and EUROSTAT population file for population. Data for Ireland 
for 2006 are from CSO, Census 2006 
 
Girouard et al. (2006) and ECB (2006) analyse the role of “fundamentals” in 
determining house prices. This research, and the research on individual EU economies 
(e.g. Duffy, 2002; Murphy, 2006 on Ireland, and Muellbauer and Murphy, 2008 for 
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the UK, Gonzalez and Ortega, 2009 for Spain), all indicate that while interest rates do 
affect house price inflation, it is only one of a range of driving variables. In the 
longer-term income growth and demographic change are very important drivers of 
changes in relative prices. 
An important variable affecting the demand for new dwellings, and hence the 
investment in housing, is the existing stock of dwellings relative to the population. 
Table 1 shows the data for a number of EU countries for 2001, (and for Ireland for 
2006) immediately after EMU began. For most of the EU 15 countries the stock of 
dwellings was high relative to the adult population (aged 20 and over) and had not 
changed much over the previous decade. This suggested that in terms of demographic 
factors these countries were close to their long run equilibrium stock. However, for 
Ireland, Portugal and Spain, when the ratio is calculated only for occupied houses, the 
stock is substantially lower relative to the adult population than for many of the other 
EU-15. 2  
 
Figure 1: Comparative Headship Rates 
Note: Ireland, 2006, Census of Ireland, Germany, 1991 and UK 1992, Labour Force Survey. 
 
If preferences for the standard of domestic accommodation are similar across EU 
populations this would suggest that, because of the fact that Ireland and Spain have 
only recently converged to the EU average in terms of income per head, their 
endowment of housing infrastructure may still be well below what might be expected 
for countries with their current standard of living. Given the slow adjustment of the 
                                                 
 
2 For Spain the stock of “unoccupied” dwellings is very high because of the importance of foreign 
investment in dwellings purely for holiday purposes. 
  6 
housing stock, it would take many years of above average investment in housing 
before the stocks in those countries will have reached the current levels in countries 
such as France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK. 
A measure of the difference in endowment is the percentage increase in the stock 
of dwellings that would be needed to raise the number of dwellings per adult in 
Ireland, Spain, and Portugal to the number in, for instance, France. Using this measure 
an increase in the stock of dwellings of roughly an eighth in each of these three 
countries would be needed to bring the endowment to French levels.  For some of the 
newer EU member states the gap is much larger; for Poland the necessary increase 
would amount to almost a quarter of the existing housing stock. 
This difference in the endowment of housing infrastructure is also reflected in a 
difference in the proportion of people at each age group in Ireland who are heads of 
households relative to other EU countries, such as Germany and the UK. Figure 1 
shows data for Ireland, Germany and the UK.  For each five-year cohort it shows the 
proportion of the cohort who are heads of households. 3 Obviously cultural 
differences, in terms of such factors as divorce etc., may affect the numbers of 
households. However, these data provide a useful indicator of the availability of 
dwellings. In spite of the relatively similar standard of living in the three countries the 
lower endowment of dwellings in Ireland means that adults have to share dwellings 
with their parents or unrelated friends under circumstances where adults in Germany 
or the UK would rent (or buy) their own apartment or house. This difference is 
particularly noticeable for those aged between 25 and 34. Garcia and Hernandez 
(2008) report similar circumstances in Spain where high prices have affected headship 
rates. They report that because of the high prices “This places an obstacle to the 
departure of young adults from the family home, delaying their emancipation age…”. 
The very rapid rise in the cost of housing over the last decade in Ireland has meant 
that the headship rates did not change at a time when living standards, measured in 
terms of real disposable income, rose dramatically. This may also have been the case 
for Spain. Now that house prices (and rents) are falling it may be anticipated that 
individuals who are currently sharing accommodation will, at some time in the future, 
                                                 
 
3 Technically referred to as household reference person. In the case of Germany if there is a male in the 
household he is normally defined as the reference person. In Ireland and the UK it is nominated by the 
household and an increasing share of them are now women.  
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enter the housing market seeking to establish a new independent household. 4  This 
overhang of potential renters or buyers will mean that, after the current adjustment, 
investment in housing is likely to remain above the average for the EU 15 for some 
time to come in Ireland, Portugal and Spain.  
 
Figure 2: Average Annual Demand for Housing in Ireland 
 
Source: Bergin, et al., 2009 
 
Figure 2 shows a decomposition of average annual housing demand in Ireland 
since 1991 together with forecasts for the future illustrating the impact of 
demographic factors. At unchanged headship rates around 20,000 additional dwellings 
a year are needed to take account of the rising number of adults, especially in the 
younger age groups. 5 Because of the rapid rise in the price of housing the headship 
rates, which are well below those in Germany and the UK, remained relatively 
unchanged over the 1990s. This reflected the rapid rise in the cost of accommodation 
which offset the effects of higher incomes. In addition, immigration has accounted for 
approximately 15,000 of the additional dwellings occupied each year between 2003 
and 2006. This reflected the fact that many immigrants to Ireland are skilled (well 
                                                 
 
4 However, there is evidence that in spite of the very serious decline in the economy in 2008 the 
number of households showed a record increase in that year suggesting a rapid response of headship 
rates to a very big reduction in rents (Bergin et al., 2009). 
5 With a very small share of the population aged over 75 the numbers dying each year leaving 
dwellings vacant for the younger generation is low. In countries such as Germany the population is 
closer to demographic balance. 
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educated) and they have similar headship rates to natives (FitzGerald et al., 2008). 
However, a very substantial share of the additional dwellings built between 2003 and 
2006 were not occupied by permanent households. While some were built as holiday 
homes many of them were built for purely speculative purposes and the build up of 
the stock of vacant dwellings after 2003 presaged future problems in the housing 
market. 
Both Spain and Ireland have a very small private rented sector with home 
ownership being the norm. In the case of Spain the home ownership rate in 2000-1 
was 81 per cent. 6 For Ireland it was around 75 per cent. The private rented sector was 
around 11 per cent in Spain and around 15 per cent in Ireland. This contrasts with 
home ownership rates in the UK and the US of just under 70 per cent and just over 40 
per cent in Germany. This means that the private rental sector in both Ireland and 
Spain is very small and, as discussed later, this may have implications for the way the 
current adjustment to falling prices plays out. 7  
Spain is in a similar position to Ireland for dwellings that are permanently 
occupied. However, in the case of Spain what makes the position very uncertain is 
that a high proportion of the new build in recent years has been designed to satisfy 
demand from abroad for holiday homes. Some of these holiday homes are owned 
directly by foreigners and some are rented by Spanish owners (individuals or 
companies) to foreigners. While holiday homes are also a factor in the demand for 
housing in Ireland they have constituted a much smaller share of the demand than in 
the case of Spain. In the case of Spain the number of holiday homes or dwellings 
otherwise vacant is almost a third of the total stock whereas in Ireland it is around 15 
per cent, still a relatively high number.  
For holiday homes a range of additional factors are important. There are cultural 
effects, where changing preferences mean that people in Northern Europe favour 
holidays in the sun. In addition, the dramatic fall in the cost of travel has made 
frequent flights to Southern Europe affordable for many in countries such as 
Germany, the UK and Ireland.  
                                                 
 
6 Data from Garcia and Hernandez, 2008 and CSO: Census of Ireland, 2006. 
7 According to the Irish consumer price index in April 2009 rents were down 13 per cent on April 2008. 
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Obviously, when a Dutch or a Swedish person chooses to buy an apartment in 
Spain it is their income rather than Spanish incomes that will be important. In 
addition, they have the option of funding the investment through local finance or 
through finance in their home country. However, in determining the user cost of such 
an investment it is the expectations as to property prices in Spain that matter rather 
than expectations of capital gains (or losses) in their home country. 
Because holiday homes are a “luxury” it is to be expected that demand will be 
more volatile than in the case of demand for dwellings to live in. However, unless 
global warming changes the climate in the North Atlantic very rapidly, it is to be 
expected that there will be continuing long-term demand for new housing in coastal 
regions of the Mediterranean. There remains uncertainty about the phasing of that 
investment over time and the location of new development round the Mediterranean. 
The data in Table 1 indicate that Poland has an even lower stock of dwellings per 
thousand adults than is the case for Spain and Ireland. In addition, in the case of 
Poland a lot of the stock of pre 1990 dwellings have major problems, in particular in 
terms of insulation. If Poland behaves in a similar manner to the converging EU-15 
countries (Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal) there is likely to be significant 
demand for new housing in coming decades. While current low income levels relative 
to the EU average mean that priority is given to other forms of investment today, in 
the future rising incomes could see a major growth in demand for new housing. As in 
Spain and Ireland, managing these pressures in the future to ensure that the rest of the 
economy is not crowded out will be important. 
3. A Model of House Prices 
 
In this section we specify and estimate new house price equations for both Ireland and 
Spain. In both cases the equation for new house prices is based on the standard 
textbook model and consists of an inverted demand equation. This specification of the 
Irish and Spanish housing models draws on the work of Murphy (1998). In the 
textbook model house prices are determined by real disposable income, the per capita 
housing stock, a proxy for the user cost of housing (mortgage interest rate less the 
change in house prices) and the percentage of the population in the key household 
formation age group of 25-34 years. Other empirical studies including those by Kenny 
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(1999) and Roche (2001) have used similar specifications. The baseline equation for 
new house prices may be written as follows: 
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The standard model does not include any variables capturing the effects of 
financial liberalisation on house prices. Roche (2003) and McQuinn (2004) use 
alternative versions of the standard model by including an average mortgage loan 
variable as a proxy for financial liberalisation. However Murphy (2006) has criticised 
the inclusion of the average mortgage variable as an explanatory variable on a number 
of grounds including the argument that the mortgage loan variable is not independent 
of house prices. In the absence of a reliable measure of financial liberalisation, we 
follow the approach of Murphy (2006) and include a dummy for 2003 which is 
designed to pick up “the combined effects of financial liberalisation, policy 
interventions since 1998 and speculative frenzy effects”.  
In Equation (2) we apply the model to Irish data. Real new house prices (defined as 
new house prices (PHNEW) deflated by the personal consumption deflator (PC)) are 
modelled as a function of real disposable income per capita (Y), the housing stock 
(HSTOCK) per head of the total population (POPt), the percentage of the population 
aged 25-34 years (POP2534) and the real cost of capital for housing (rr). A dummy 
variable is included for 2003 (D03) 8. The user cost variable is calculated as the 
mortgage interest rate less the three period moving average of the rate of inflation in 
new houses 9.  
 
                                                 
 
8 The dummy variable is set equal to zero up to and including 2003 and is set equal to one thereafter.  
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The full estimation results are shown in Appendix 1. The estimated coefficients on 
the equation for new house prices show the expected signs. The coefficient on income 
measures the responsiveness of house prices to changes in income. The elasticity of .9 
is high and suggests a high degree of pass through of changes in income to new house 
prices. The coefficient on the per capita housing stock variable is significant and 
negatively signed indicating the importance of a scarcity effect. This implies that 
Ireland’s relatively low endowment of dwellings coupled with strong population 
growth in the 1990s was an important driver of house prices. The demographic 
variable is positive and significant indicating that the expansion of the key house 
buying population cohort contributed to the increase in new house prices. The 
coefficient on the real cost of capital is significant and correctly signed. The 
coefficient on the 2003 dummy is significant and may be picking up the combined 
effects of a more liberalised mortgage market, demand and supply side policy 
measures which drove up house prices and the speculative frenzy which accompanied 
the rapid appreciation in the value of new houses.  
We next apply the standard housing model with some adjustments to the Spanish 
data and draw comparisons with the estimation results for Ireland. In equation (3) new 
house prices are a function of real household disposable income per capita (Y), the 
housing stock (HSTOCK) per head of the total population (POPt), the percentage of 
the population aged 25-34 years (POP2534) and the real cost of capital for housing 
(rr). This mirrors the specification of Irish house prices in equation (2) and the 
standard house price model represented by equation (1). In addition two dummy 
variables are included for the years 1987 and 2003. The 1987 dummy is designed to 
capture the effect of Spain’s accession to the EU which involved major liberalization 
in the Spanish economy, including changes in the financial system, while the 2003 
dummy is included to pick up the bubble effect on house prices of the boom in the 
Spanish property market during the early 2000’s. The full estimation results are 
shown in Appendix 1.  
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The estimated coefficients for new house prices in the equation for Spain show the 
expected signs, however the magnitude of the coefficients differ compared to results 
for Ireland. The estimation results for Spain show that a 1 per cent rise in real income 
per capita leads to a 1.1 per cent rise in house prices compared to a 0.9 per cent rise in 
Ireland. The housing stock per capita variable has a substantially bigger effect in the 
Spanish equation than in the Irish equation.  
The estimation results for both Ireland and Spain show that the increase in the 
proportion of the population in the key household formation age group was an 
important driver of new house prices. A 0.01 unit rise in the household formation ratio 
leads to a 14.1 per cent rise in new house prices in Ireland and a 25.6 per cent rise in 
Spain. Lower interest rates also contributed to higher new house prices in both Ireland 
and Spain. The estimation results show that a one percentage point rise in the user 
cost variable leads to almost a 1 per cent fall in house prices in Ireland and a .9 per 
cent fall in Spain.  
Faust et al (2001) have estimated a standard monetary policy reaction function for 
the Bundesbank based on a simple Taylor rule and have compared the ECB’s actual 
monetary policy with the predictions from this reaction function, using Euro Area 
data. They find that ECB interest rates have been consistently below those predicted 
by the estimated Taylor rule. For Ireland Faust et al find that in 1999 had interest rates 
been determined by a Taylor rule the fitted target rate in that year would have 
averaged 9.2 per cent. This corresponds to a discrepancy of 6.4 per cent between the 
average predicted target rate and the actual rate that prevailed in that year. Applying 
this to the coefficient on the real interest rate in equation (2) this implies that had 
interest rates in Ireland been 6.4 per cent higher in 1999 this would have reduced 
house prices by around 6.2 per cent. For Spain Faust et al estimate that interest rates 
in 1999 would have been 4.7 per cent higher than the actual rate, using a Taylor rule. 
With an estimated coefficient of .85 on the real interest rate term in equation (3) this 
implies that house prices in Spain would have been reduced by a further 4 per cent 
had interest rates averaged the 7.3 per cent predicted by the Taylor rule rather than the 
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average actual rate of 2.8 per cent which prevailed at the time. This is a simple 
measure of the initial impact of EMU membership on the housing markets in Spain 
and Ireland. 
Finally two time dummies are included in the Spanish model. The coefficient on 
the 1987 dummy indicates that house prices in Spain in that year were 10 per cent 
higher after taking account of the other variables in the model. The positive and 
significant coefficient on the 1987 dummy variable picks up the impact of Spain’s 
accession to the EU in 1986.  
As in the equation for Ireland the 2003 dummy is included in the Spanish equation 
to capture the combined effects of financial liberalisation, policy interventions and 
speculative frenzy effects which gave rise to strong growth in Spanish house prices 
post 2003 – behaviour that cannot be captured in a standard model of house prices. 
The effect of the 2003 dummy is to raise house prices by about 27 per cent above the 
level explained by the other variables in the model. Without a measure of financial 
liberalisation it is difficult to establish the precise effect of more favourable financial 
conditions on house prices in Spain. However, as for Ireland, the Spanish housing 
boom was undoubtedly propagated by a combination of a more liberalised mortgage 
market, policy changes and frenzy activity as reflected in the significance and 
magnitude of the dummy variables in both equation (2) and (3). 
Overall the estimation results for Ireland and Spain indicate that fundamentals such 
as income, demographics, the size of the existing housing stock and the user cost of 
capital are crucial determinants of new house prices. In addition, the results suggest 
that other factors such as financial liberalisation and frenzy effects are likely to have 
raised the level of house prices above where they otherwise would have been, 
particularly in the period after 2003 when both countries experienced a housing boom. 
4. The Cost of Capital 
 
Prior to EMU there were substantial differences in the cost of capital facing 
householders across the EU. These differences in the cost of capital may have slowed 
investment in housing in some countries where they were relatively high. However, 
the advent of EMU substantially changed the expected cost of capital facing agents in 
many member states of the Euro area.  It meant that there was substantial convergence 
in the nominal interest rate facing similar agents across the EMU. However, because 
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of continuing differences in the rate of inflation across the EMU real interest rates still 
differ for households. 
EMU “liberalised” credit markets 
The financial sector has undergone major changes over the last thirty years. This has 
involved both liberalisation and the changes consequent on the move to Economic and 
Monetary Union. These two developments have combined to provide a dramatically 
different environment today for households wanting to finance investment in housing 
compared to thirty years ago. In the 1970s many households in Ireland and Spain were 
credit constrained and were not able to finance their optimal level of investment in 
housing. However, it was not just the availability of finance that has changed but its 
cost has also been reduced by the move to monetary union and also by financial 
liberalisation in the 1990s and the early years of this decade. Worldwide lax monetary 
policy over the last decade reduced the cost of capital, not just in Ireland and Spain, 
but also for households in most developed economies. However, the advent of EMU 
as well as financial liberalisation potentially reduced the cost of finance by making 
available a much wider pool of savings without incurring exchange rate risk. 
In the Irish case, up to the end of the 1970s all mortgage finance was provided by 
“building societies”. These financial institutions raised all their finance from deposits, 
generally by households. They were all mutual companies facing rather different 
incentives than private limited companies (that can be assumed to be profit 
maximisers). As a result, interest rates were not used as an instrument to clear the 
mortgage market and there was widespread credit rationing. In some cases the 
building societies operated queuing based on the length of time that a borrower had 
previously been a depositor.  
Over the course of the 1980s the standard banking system moved into the mortgage 
market and building societies began to raise some of their funds from the interbank 
market rather than from small depositors. Also the building societies themselves 
moved away from the mutual model so that they had an incentive to use price (the 
interest rate) to clear the market. 
There are a number of implications of these institutional changes. In the 1970s 
credit rationing was the norm in finance for housing. The interest rate was dependent 
on the availability of domestic savings and would have been little affected by 
exchange rate risks. The extent of rationing would have depended on the competition 
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for personal deposits and the demand for mortgages. However, over the course of the 
1980s as the market liberalised and as financial institutions had access to the interbank 
market, the constraint on finance was relaxed. Instead the cost of finance was 
increasingly related to the cost of funds on the local interbank market. 
Table 2: Excess Returns from Borrowing in DMs and lending in local currency 
 1980-1998 1985-1998 
Ireland 2.0 1.6 
Spain 1.4 1.9 
UK 10 2.1  
 
The Impact of EMU – nominal interest rates 
One of the key long-term reasons why membership of EMU was considered desirable 
for Ireland and many other potential members was the expected impact on interest 
rates and the cost of capital (Baker, Fitz Gerald and Honohan, 1996, Calmfors, 1997). 
For countries such as Spain, Ireland, and the UK, historically there had been a 
significant risk premium attaching to borrowing in their own currency relative to 
borrowing in DMs. Table 2 shows a measure of the risk premium, the excess returns 
for governments from borrowing in DMs and lending in the local currency, for two 
time periods, 1980-1999 and 1985-1999. This is calculated using medium-term 
government bonds – it is the risk premium that faced the government sector. The 
advent of EMU saw such differentials between yields on government bonds almost 
disappear. However, over the past year the differentials have again reappeared in a 
dramatic form as a consequence of the current financial crisis and the differing 
exposure of different countries to its consequences. 
Thus for most of the member governments, as expected, the advent of EMU 
substantially reduced the cost of capital. This had a very striking positive impact on 
the public finances for countries that were heavily indebted, especially where the debt 
was financed on a short to medium term basis – Italy. The notable exception to this 
was Germany which had experienced a lower real cost of capital for some 
considerable time. 
                                                 
 
10 For the UK it is 1979-1998. 
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Multinational firms trading on the world market always had the opportunity to 
borrow in DMs, availing of the lower cost of finance. With diversified trade such 
firms could also hedge their currency risk within the firm itself, availing of the lowest 
available cost of finance  internationally. In recent years, with financial liberalisation, 
many commercial firms in the EU also had access to financial instruments which 
allowed them to hedge some of their foreign currency risk at a price. This meant that 
for multinational firms the cost of capital was probably lower than for firms trading 
purely on the domestic market. This would suggest that the benefits of a reduction in 
nominal interest rates as a result of EMU, while significant for the company sector, 
were probably greatest for smaller firms.  
For much of the private sector borrowing in the local currency in Ireland, Spain 
and elsewhere a significant exchange risk premium was payable prior to EMU as a 
cost of having an independent currency. This meant that the cost of capital for housing 
in such countries had been substantially greater than that for households in Germany 
and other countries where interest rates were broadly related to the DM. As this 
difference in the cost of capital had persisted over a long period it meant that prior to 
EMU, even with similar income levels and demographics, the optimal long-run stock 
of dwellings would have been lower than in Germany or the Netherlands. The advent 
of EMU, reducing the cost of capital permanently for households, will have raised the 
optimal long run stock of dwellings. 
In addition to the interest rate premium payable by the household sector in Ireland 
and Spain prior to EMU, there was a further factor that is difficult to quantify, but 
which affected the availability of capital to fund housing investment. In the case of 
both Spain and Ireland we have seen in recent years that the surge in investment in 
housing has had its counterpart in a major increase in the balance of payments deficit. 
In turn, this deficit has been partially financed by the financial system borrowing 
abroad to onlend to the domestic household sector to fund their housing investment.  
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Figure 3:  Net Foreign Liabilities of Banking System, Ireland 
 
Prior to EMU the cost of funds on the Irish or Spanish interbank markets was 
affected by the supply and demand for funds in Ireland and Spain and the cost of 
foreign exchange. As discussed above there was a significant risk premium attached 
to lending in local currency relative to lending in DMs. Where traditional banks and 
building societies could fund their mortgage lending from local deposits the situation 
may have been similar in character to that in the 1970s and the 1980s. However, 
where the financial system was borrowing abroad to fund its lending, the exchange 
risk involved would have been passed through to borrowers. This would have 
involved both higher interest rates and the possibility of increased volatility. 
Figure 3 shows the net foreign liabilities of the domestic financial system in 
Ireland, Spain and Poland relative to GDP. Over the last decade the housing booms in 
both Ireland and Spain relied on the availability of a ready supply of bank credit in the 
form of mortgages. If banks had behaved as in the 1970s and the 1980s they would 
have rationed mortgages while relying purely on domestic funds. To some extent this 
“rationing” might have shown up in an increase in the domestic interest rate unless 
monetary policy had proved accommodating. However, the liberalisation of the 
banking systems meant that banks were not constrained by their domestic deposit 
base, or even by the availability of funds on the local market. 
As discussed above, in the 1980s and the early 1990s external borrowing by the 
domestic banking system would have involved a substantial foreign exchange risk 
premium. If banks had had to have recourse to this source of finance they would have 
been forced to pass on the cost of this premium to their customers. The resulting rise 
in interest rates would have slowed, if not choked off the housing booms in both 
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countries at an early stage. Such an outcome would also have prevented the housing 
booms reaching the level they did in both Spain and Ireland.  
Instead, with the advent of EMU (and prior to the financial crisis), the domestic 
banking systems in both Ireland and Spain were able to raise substantial additional 
resources without any exchange risk and this provided the financing for a very large 
continuing investment in new building in both economies. In the case of Ireland this 
increase occurred very rapidly from 2003 onwards. With the collapse in house 
building in the Irish economy in 2008 (and in investment generally) the banks have 
begun the process of reducing their foreign borrowing.  
The path of liberalisation of the Spanish financial system is rather different from 
that for Ireland. However, the 1990s also saw the development of a liberalised regime 
with a move away from credit rationing, as well as the move to EMU membership at 
the end of the decade.  
The situation in Ireland and Spain in the period to 2008 was that banks had to raise 
very substantial funds abroad to finance the domestic housing boom. This was 
reflected in the dramatic rise since 2003 in the net foreign liabilities of the Irish 
domestic banking system shown in Figure 3. Because the funds are being raised in 
euros and the banks liabilities are also denominated in euros there is no exchange rate 
risk. In addition to raising additional funds on the Euro market, prior to the credit 
crisis it proved possible for banks to securitise mortgages and sell them on to the 
European market, reducing their exposure to the domestic market and raising 
additional funds to either finance more mortgage lending or investment in other 
assets.  
The effect of EMU membership has thus been to reduce the financing costs for 
households engaging in a huge investment programme in domestic housing in Spain 
and Ireland. Prior to EMU such a boom would probably have fizzled out at a much 
earlier stage as banks faced an ever rising cost of funds, costs which they would have 
had to pass on to customers. 
However, while EMU played a very important role in relaxing the constraints on 
the banking systems in Ireland and Spain the importance of the wider integration of 
financial markets should not be underestimated. The low cost of finance world-wide 
not only affected the Euro area but also the other members of the EU. As shown in 
Figure 3, Poland, while not a member of EMU saw a rather similar process, though on 
a more limited scale, where domestic banks borrowed abroad to fund domestic 
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investment. However, unlike in Ireland, much of this funding may have been sourced 
within individual banks from their parents in Austria, Italy or Scandinavia. 
Nonetheless whatever the immediate source of the funds it did allow housing 
investment to expand in Poland. 
A substantial part of this lending in Poland and Hungary took place in foreign 
currencies, especially Euros and Swiss Francs (Pawlowski, 2006). While this provided 
funding for housing to the household sector at a low nominal interest rate it also 
transferred the related exchange risk to those households. The fact that this source of 
funding was available at a low nominal interest rate in Poland (and other EU members 
not part of the Euro area) suggests that even without the advent of EMU, financial 
liberalisation could have still allowed significant housing booms in Ireland and Spain 
over the last decade. 
The Real Cost of Capital 
For firms selling their goods on the world market, whose output price is set on that 
market, the appropriate price deflator to use in calculating the real rate of interest is 
their output price. As a consequence differences in domestic inflation rates do not 
necessarily affect their cost of capital. Thus where a firm manufacturing cars in Spain, 
sells those cars at a price determined on the EU market in Germany, the Spanish rate 
of inflation in consumer prices does not directly affect its real cost of capital. Within 
EMU, with similar nominal interest rates across all EU members for similar firms the 
cost of capital for such firms is, as a result, independent of their location within the 
EMU and of the local rate of inflation in consumer prices. 11  
However, for the household sector the appropriate price deflator is that for personal 
consumers’ expenditure. As shown in Figure 4, in both Ireland and Spain real interest 
rates for households were very high in the early 1990s. However, with the approach of 
EMU real rates began to fall rapidly. While EMU was the major factor in the fall in 
interest rates, developments in global financial markets also played some role.  
 
 
                                                 
 
11 Obviously higher rates of inflation in consumer prices may translate into growing labour cost 
differentials which would differentially affect firms in different countries in the EMU. 
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Figure 4: Real Interest Rates in Ireland and Spain 
 
While EMU brought about a substantial reduction in the real cost of capital for 
households in many member countries, this reduction was particularly marked in the 
case of Spain and Ireland. With much higher rates of inflation in consumer prices in 
Ireland and Spain over the course of the first decade of EMU the real interest rate 
faced by the household sector in those countries was much lower than in Germany or 
France. In turn, this encouraged further investment in housing, adding to the pressure 
on the labour market and, ultimately, domestic consumer prices.  
In addition to the reduction in the real interest rate for households, EMU made it 
much easier for the domestic financial system to fund a major investment surge by 
households. The fact that this change occurred as a result of a regime change (EMU) 
meant that it was perceived as a permanent reduction in the cost of capital raising the 
optimal long run stock of housing. When combined with the lower endowment of 
dwellings in Spain and Ireland it is not surprising that there was a strong impact on 
the housing sector.  
5. The Role of Building in the Economy 
 
The building and construction sector, and housing in particular, accounts for very 
different shares of the economy across EU member states. For those economies such 
as France and Germany, where the housing stock appears to be close to its long-term 
equilibrium, investment in housing accounts for around 5 to 6 per cent of GDP (Table 
3). The average for the US is under 5 per cent. Over the last thirty five years, while 
there have been fluctuations in the share of housing investment in GDP, the difference 
in share between peak and trough has been between 3 and 4 percentage points of 
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GDP. This actually exaggerates the extent of the cyclical fluctuations for these 
countries as the peak occurred in the 1970s and the trough in the last decade. For the 
UK, housing investment accounts for an even smaller share of GDP. In the case of 
France and Germany, their recent investment in building and construction, expressed 
as a share of GDP, has been below the average for the last 35 years (Table 3). For the 
UK it has been slightly above the average, though well below the highest levels 
achieved in the past. 
Table 3: Housing Investment as a share of GDP, 1970-2005, per cent 
 Housing Other building 
Share of GDP Average Maximum Minimum 2005 Average Maximum Minimum 2005 
France 5.4 7.9 4.1 4.6 5.8 7.6 4.1 5.1 
Germany 6.5 8.2 5.2 5.6 6.6 10.0 3.8 3.8 
UK 3.6 4.5 2.8 3.9 5.2 7.0 4.3 5.0 
Ireland 6.1 13.9 3.7 13.9 6.0 8.6 4.0 6.0 
Spain 5.4 8.9 4.1 8.9 7.3 9.2 6.2 8.3 
Poland, 1996-05 2.6 3.0 2.2 2.7 8.8 10.6 7.6 7.6 
 
Figure 5: Housing Investment as a % of GDP 12 
 
The fact that housing accounts for a limited share of GDP does not prevent bubbles 
in house prices from occurring or from affecting aggregate economic activity through 
wealth effects but it does limit the direct effects of the housing cycle on aggregate 
demand. In the UK, in spite of the small share of economic activity accounted for by 
housing investment, it has suffered two cases of house price bubbles bursting in the 
last 20 years – one around 1990 and the second that is currently taking place. 
In the case of Ireland and Spain the situation is very different, with the difference 
between the highest and lowest share of housing in GDP in Spain being just under 5 
                                                 
 
12 In the case of Ireland it is as a percentage of GNP. 
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percentage points of GDP and a massive 10 per cent in the case of Ireland. In the case 
of both of these countries housing investment in 2006 accounted for a record share of 
GDP (Figure 5). This peak in activity is not just a cyclical event – the share of GDP 
accounted for by housing investment has been well above the previous levels over the 
past decade in both these countries reflecting both the demographic factors discussed 
above and also the changed circumstances of EMU. These two economies could not 
continue allocating such a high share of economic resources to this form of 
investment indefinitely. 
The housing price and output booms in Spain and Ireland had a major impact on 
both these economies. To allocate such a high share of national resources to 
investment in housing, a major redeployment of resources was needed into the 
building and construction sector. High prices for housing and the enhanced 
profitability of the building sector resulted in a major expansion in activity, requiring 
a dramatic increase in the labour force employed in that sector. This bid up wage rates 
in the sector relative to the levels they would otherwise have maintained. In turn this 
attracted labour from other sector of the economy. 13 
While a significant part of the additional labour force in building and construction 
in both Ireland and Spain came from returning emigrants (in the case of Ireland), or 
from immigration in the case of both countries, there was, nonetheless, a major impact 
on the domestic labour market. At the peak approximately 20 per cent of employees in 
building and construction in Ireland were immigrants whereas the share in the late 
1990s would have been close to zero. While this influx of labour moderated the 
impact on wage rates, it was not sufficient to offset the huge stimulus to the domestic 
labour markets in the two economies. The result has been that wage rates throughout 
the two economies rose much more rapidly than in the rest of EMU so that both 
economies lost competitiveness (Duffy et al., 2005).  
The result of this demand shock has been that the tradable sector, in both Ireland 
and Spain, has been “crowded out” by the building and construction sector. Both 
countries have seen a rapid decline in market share for their exports and the result has 
                                                 
 
13 For example, in Ireland there has been a dramatic shift in the numbers training as engineers with the 
number of civil engineers growing dramatically and the number of electrical and electronic engineers 
falling. The reduced supply of electrical engineers, in turn, puts upward pressure on wages affecting 
sectors of the economy not involved in building and construction. 
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been a rapidly rising balance of payments deficit. This process is very similar to that 
where a major expansion in the public sector crowds out the (tradable) private sector. 
This process is described in Blanchard, 2007 where he illustrates the potential 
problems caused by this crowding out and concludes that government action may be 
required to moderate this process even in a perfect market (Blanchard, 2007). 
This development would not necessarily have been very serious if the reallocation 
of resources to the building and construction sector were permanent. However, as 
argued above, the reallocation was essentially temporary due to a “catching up” in the 
stock of dwellings. If the catch up had been better managed by the respective 
governments so that it took place over a longer time scale then the reallocation of 
resources would have been more limited and the period for which the resources would 
have been utilised in the building and construction sector would have been much 
longer. As it is, the collapse in housing output in Ireland and Spain is releasing major 
resources, especially labour, resulting in a very rapid rise in the unemployment rate. 
However, while many firms in the tradable sector were forced to shut down due to 
their loss of competitiveness over the last five years, it will be quite a number of years 
before the labour market adjusts to restore competitiveness. Even then it will be some 
time before domestic output of tradables adjusts to fill the gap 14. 
As the adjustment continues, the balance of payments deficits in both countries can 
be expected to fall. However, in the case of Spain it is to be expected that in the long 
run there will be a continuing significant balance of payments deficit. Because so 
much of the demand for housing in Spain is for holiday homes and because many of 
these are bought by foreigners, the resulting capital inflow could sustain a substantial 
deficit over a prolonged period. While sales of holiday homes to foreigners are treated 
as a sale of an asset they are very close to being a tradable commodity. It is possible, 
if the market so desires, to build holiday homes very densely in large numbers for the 
foreseeable future – there is not a fixed supply of assets. This makes this market 
sustainable. The case is rather different for Estonia where much of medieval Tallinn 
has been sold to foreigners. As it takes a millennium to build a medieval dwelling 
such a flow of inward investment is not sustainable. 
                                                 
 
14 Bergin et al., 2009) 
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With approximately a third of Spanish dwellings being holiday homes they are 
financed by a substantial capital inflow. If all of these homes were owned and 
financed by foreigners (a considerable exaggeration) this would mean that the capital 
inflow related to such transactions would amount to one third of the investment in 
housing – around 3 per cent of GDP in 2006. Unlike investment in financial assets 
such investment in property is fairly illiquid which means that there is little danger of 
a reversal of the capital flow (though of course the inflow can dry up). In reality the 
capital inflow is probably less than this but it is still significant and must be taken into 
account in considering the size of the Spanish balance of payments deficit and its 
long-term sustainability. 
Because of the size of the housing sector in Ireland and Spain the magnitude of the 
potential contraction is also very large. Whereas in the US and the UK a housing bust 
could see the fall in domestic demand directly caused by the contraction in housing 
amounting to two or at most three percentage points of GDP, in Ireland and Spain the 
potential contraction could amount to between 5 and 10 per cent of GDP. 
The experience of Ireland and Spain holds out important lessons for other 
governments: there is a need to manage domestic housing markets using fiscal policy 
and financial regulation. For example, Poland currently has a low endowment of 
housing and is devoting a small share of national resources to new investment in the 
sector. This is not surprising. However, with rising incomes, financial liberalisation 
and membership of EMU Poland would be ripe for a housing boom. If not managed 
appropriately this could pre-empt resources needed for more productive uses as it has 
done in Spain and Ireland. 
Chauvin and Le Bayon (2005) considered the housing markets in Spain, France, 
the UK and the US. Their conclusion was that of those four countries only in Spain 
was there a risk of a housing bubble. FitzGerald et al., 2005 warned of the dangers of 
a housing bust in Ireland and modelled the possible impact of such an event. 
Cameron, et al (2006) reached a rather different conclusion for the UK suggesting that 
a significant risk of a bubble existing in that economy. Rae and van den Noord (2006), 
looking at the Irish economy suggested that house prices were significantly above 
their equilibrium level. In EUROFRAME-EFN, 2006, the exposure of the Irish and 
Spanish economies to shocks was considered. It was suggested in that report that in 
the case of both economies there was a risk of a housing bubble.  
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Throughout 2006 house prices continued to rise in Ireland, Spain and the UK and 
the building construction sector continued to increase its share of economic activity in 
the former two countries putting pressure on the tradable sector. As we know now the 
bubble has burst in all three economies (as well as in the US). The question is now 
what the impact of this will be on those economies and how long it will be before they 
return to “normal”. 
 
Table 4: International Experience of Real House Price Falls 
 Maximum Fall in Price 
Denmark -37 
Finland -50 
France -18 
Germany -15 
Ireland 15 -27 
Netherlands -50 
Sweden -38 
United Kingdom -34 
United States -14 
Source: OECD, 2005 Economic Outlook, No. 78, November. 
 
In all three economies the turning point came when potential buyers lost 
confidence in the prospect of future capital gains and stopped buying. The result was a 
fall in price and with the prospect of further falls in prices the user cost of owner 
occupation rose very rapidly. In turn, the building industry itself reacts with a 
significant lag so that output continued high in 2007. It is really only in 2008 in 
Ireland that the output of the sector began to show major adjustment. 
What is interesting about the Spanish and Irish cases (and it is also true of the US) 
is that the bursting of the bubble was not caused by uncertainty in the financial 
markets but had a domestic trigger which changed agents expectations about future 
capital gains. Of course in the US it was the downturn in the housing market which 
caused (rather than was caused by) the financial dislocation that is so troubling the 
world economy.  In the case of Ireland and Spain there is also very significant fall-out 
for the financial system from the burst property market bubble. In the case of the Irish 
financial system there was no exposure to toxic US assets. Instead the overexposure to 
risky domestic lending for property development has precipitated a major domestic 
financial crisis. 
                                                 
 
15 In Ireland the fall in real house prices was experienced between the third quarter of 1981 and the 
second quarter of 1987. 
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Table 4 shows the maximum falls in price that have occurred in the past in a 
sample of OECD economies when local housing bubbles burst. The largest falls 
experienced in the past were in Finland and the Netherlands where prices fell by 50 
per cent. In quite a number of cases, including Ireland and the UK, the previous 
largest falls were of the order of 30 per cent. Past experience cannot tell us what will 
happen this time around in Ireland, Spain and the UK but it is a guide to the fact that 
the falls may be very significant (Kelly, 2007). 
In the case of Ireland Van den Noord (2006) suggested an overvaluation of 15 per 
cent. Fitz Gerald et al., 2005, considered the potential for a fall in nominal house 
prices in Ireland of a third. However, while the equilibrium price might be 15 per cent 
(or even 30 per cent) below its peak level in 2006, prices may initially fall further than 
that. They will continue to fall until buyers are convinced that they can go no further 
down. As buyers return to the market they may then raise prices, which, by holding 
out the prospect of potential capital gains, in turn, reduces the user cost of housing 
thereby stimulating the market. Thus it is very difficult to forecast the trajectory of 
prices towards a new equilibrium as a bubble bursts. 
The potential effects on Ireland of the housing bubble bursting were considered in 
detail in Fitz Gerald, et al., 2005. Since that analysis was carried out the housing 
sector continued to expand for one further year, buoyed up by inappropriately 
stimulatory government policy. Thus the potential fall in output could be larger than 
that work envisaged. However, it does give a reasonable quantification of the 
potential impact of the bursting of the housing bubble on the economy.  
However, for both Spain and Ireland the bursting of the property market bubble has 
coincided with the world recession and this has greatly aggravated the effects on the 
two economies.  In the case of Ireland the cumulative fall in GDP over the period 
2008-10 is expected to be around 12 per cent (Barrett et al., 2009) while the fall in 
Spain could be of the order of 3 per cent (Holland et al., 2009). Rising unemployment 
will result in a major slowdown in the rate of increase in labour costs, especially in 
Ireland. (Current forecasts using a model of the labour market suggest that nominal 
wage rates could fall by 7 per cent between 2009 and 2011, Bergin et al. , 2009.) If 
such an adjustment in labour costs does take place it will eventually result in an 
expansion in the tradable sector of the economy as exports rise consistent with a more 
competitive environment. However, there is likely to be a major permanent reduction 
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in Irish output as a result of the combined impact of the bursting of the property 
market bubble and the world recession. 
In terms of the macro-economic dislocation consequent on the bursting of the 
housing bubble, a very important factor will be how long the adjustment to a new 
equilibrium takes. Typically, in the OECD area it takes between one and two years for 
sellers to accept a fall in real house prices of 10 percentage points (Kelly, 2007). This 
would suggest that if nominal house prices were to fall by a third relative to their peak 
in Ireland it could take between three and four years. 16  
The longer drawn out the adjustment process the greater the economic cost. While 
sellers refuse to contemplate a major fall in price and potential buyers hold out of the 
market there is no incentive for anyone to build more dwellings. In addition, all the 
businesses which are closely allied to the housing market (mortgage lenders, lawyers, 
estate agents, suppliers of furniture etc.) experience a dramatic downturn in activity. If 
sellers could be persuaded to adjust their expectations much more rapidly, so that 
prices find their long-term equilibrium level, the housing sector would see an earlier 
return to “normal”. In the case of the UK today the adjustment of expectations seems 
unusually rapid, which may hasten the end of the crisis. In Ireland house prices seem 
to be falling at the rate of around 10 per cent a year. 
Another measure of the extent of the adjustment needed is the excess stock of 
unoccupied dwellings. It is difficult to estimate such a number but it is clear that there 
is a build up in stocks of finished dwellings in both Ireland and Spain. Until these 
dwellings are filled through renting or sale to new households there will continue to 
be downward pressure on the market. In both countries the demographics mean that 
there will be a continuing rise in household numbers in spite of the slowdown. Thus, 
even with inertia, the excess stock will be gradually eaten away. However, it is likely 
that the dynamics of the market will produce a somewhat faster resolution. 
Pressures from the banking system to see an immediate return on the assets has 
resulted in a significant part of the excess stock being put on the rental market. There 
is strong evidence that this is happening with a consequential major reduction in rents. 
As outlined earlier, the rental market is very thin in Ireland and Spain and such an 
outcome would have a major initial downward impact on rents. Already renting is 
                                                 
 
16 This takes account of the underlying rate of inflation in the economy. 
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more attractive than purchase at current house prices. With rents falling and no 
prospect in the next year of a rise in house prices there is every incentive for 
households to rent rather than buy. However, the fall in the cost of housing will result 
in a rise in demand. In particular, the much lower headship rates in Ireland and Spain 
than might be expected means that there is considerable scope for headship rates to 
rise. Bergin et al., 2009, suggests that this is already happening in Ireland in spite of 
the rising unemployment rate. Once the non-housing economy shows signs of 
recovering there could be a rapid take-up of “surplus” rented dwellings and a move by 
Irish and Spanish households to a more “European” rate of household formation. 
6. Managing the housing market under EMU 
 
Since the mid-1990s there has been considerable debate about how fiscal policy 
should be used within EMU (Butti et al., 2003). A lot of attention has been given to 
the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and the need to prevent government deficits 
exceeding 3 per cent of GDP. However, much less attention has been given to how 
fiscal policy should be used to manage individual regional economies. In particular, 
the potential problems that may arise for regional economies in EMU from local asset 
market bubbles, primarily in property, have not received much attention. We know 
now that the costs of failing to control such phenomena are very high and can be 
magnified by the damage done to the regional financial system. 17   
Generally, where substantial bubbles do occur they are reflected in a significant 
balance of payments deficit. In the case of Spain the rising balance of payments 
deficit goes back to the early years of EMU whereas for Ireland it only manifested 
itself in the last five years. In both cases the balance of payments deficit was a 
symptom of the domestic crowding out of the tradable sector due to the dramatic 
increase in building activity beyond its sustainable level. The consequence was a rapid 
rise in domestic costs, pricing the tradable sector out of its world markets.  
                                                 
 
17 The potential damage done to regional economies from bursting property market bubbles is also 
significant for regions in the US. However, in the US the attention has focused more on using financial 
regulation rather than fiscal policy to manage property markets. 
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Figure 6: General Government Balance as a % of GDP 
Source: AMECO database 
 
Looking at Ireland and Spain in 2001, Blanchard, 2001, suggested that significant 
balance of payments deficit then apparent in Spain suggested a need to tighten fiscal 
policy whereas for Ireland, running a balance of payments surplus, a real appreciation 
of the exchange rate was appropriate. However, on this basis, as Ireland moved into 
balance of payments deficit in 2003, a similar prescription would have been 
appropriate. While both countries complied with the rules of the Stability and Growth 
Pact running small surpluses this was not adequate to protect their own economies 
from the risk of overheating. Instead what was required was a policy similar to that 
adopted in Scandinavia where fiscal policy ran a substantial surplus preventing 
serious overheating. Figure 6 shows the general government balance in Ireland, Spain 
and Finland in recent years. As a result of a more prudent fiscal policy Finland now 
finds itself better equipped to face the current economic crisis. Thus within EMU it 
may be prudent for countries to run substantial surpluses for a number of years where 
domestic inflationary pressures are posing problems. 
While EMU may not make an EMU-wide housing bubble any more likely, the 
restriction on the use of the interest rate to manage the domestic housing market 
increases risks from housing shocks for individual economies.  As a result, monetary 
policy, which was potentially an effective tool for managing national housing market 
is no longer available for that purpose. There are, therefore, concerns, that the 
authorities in individual countries such as Ireland and Spain are handicapped in 
managing potential risks to their economic stability arising from housing market 
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developments. However, there are other instruments available to governments in 
EMU to achieve the same effect. The problem is just that they have not been used. 
In preparation for possible membership of EMU the management of the housing 
sector was considered by the British Treasury in a document published in 2003 
(Treasury, 2003). They considered that the loss of the interest rate instrument would 
obviously restrict the scope for economic policy to manage this important sector of 
the economy. They suggested that policy makers would have to make more active use 
of fiscal instruments, specifically taxation, to manage risks to the wider economy 
arising from possible housing bubbles. In particular, they suggested that stamp duty (a 
transactions tax) could be used to temporarily change the cost of housing investment 
for households. Fitz Gerald, 2001, suggested reducing income tax allowances for 
mortgage interest payments or even a tax on mortgage interest payments. 
In each case the effect of the tax instrument would be to raise the cost of borrowing 
or financing housing investment, tending to reduce demand pressures and, hence, 
prices below the level they would otherwise reach.  As outlined in the model in 
Section 3, by raising the cost of capital such a tax would exert significant downward 
pressure on house prices. Through its effect on the income of potential borrowers it 
would also tend to reduce demand pressures. Of the alternatives the taxation of 
mortgage interest payments may be the best instrument to use. In increasing the 
current outgoings of households it would reduce their ability to take on debt. As a 
result, when the danger of a bubble is over and the taxes are abolished or reduced, 
households would end up with a lower stock of debt for the same stock of housing. 
However, adopting such targeted fiscal policy instruments may be difficult to explain 
to a wider public.  
Within the Euro area the risks to the financial sector from any potential, housing 
bubble depend on the extent of the regional banking system’s exposure to the regional 
economy and its exposure within that economy to the housing (property) sector. 18  
Because of the fact that housing bubbles are essentially regional in nature, the more 
geographically diversified the financial system is the more robust it will be in the face 
                                                 
 
18 Here we are only considering the direct exposure of the regional banking  system to the local market. 
As we have seen the exposure of the European banking system to the US sub-prime market was very 
substantial. This risk transfer occurred through the use of complicated financial instruments. The 
regulation of such instruments is a separate issue not considered here. 
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of idiosyncratic shocks. However, it is important for the regulatory authorities when 
stress testing their financial systems to take account of both the regional diversity of a 
bank’s loan portfolio and also to take account of the possible wider economic 
consequences of a housing bubble. In particular, when housing bubbles burst they 
tend to be associated with much wider macro-economic disruption, which is likely to 
affect employment and output levels. 
A serious shock to the agricultural, energy and regional property sectors in the 
Federal Reserve of Kansas City District in the US in the mid-1980s caused many local 
banks to fail. 19 As a result of this experience the local Federal Reserve Board 
advocated greatly increased securitisation of mortgage debt in its Economic Review in 
subsequent years. This was designed to reduce the vulnerability of the local financial 
system, which was very exposed to the regional economy (due to lack of regional 
diversification due to the operation of the Glass-Stiegel act). However, we have seen 
the dangers that securitisation can bring: the securitisation of mortgage assets in the 
US spread the risks of a housing bust far and wide. This highlighted the fact that 
securitisation is only as good as the original mortgage assets and we have seen that in 
the case of the US these assets were not very good! However, if properly regulated 
such instruments may still prove important in reducing risks where banking systems 
are regional in nature. 
The financial regulatory authorities in individual regional economies can play a 
vital role in ensuring the financial stability of their financial systems. If more attention 
had been paid to the threats to financial stability in Ireland the problems today would 
be much less acute than they actually are. However, in a financially integrated world, 
where banks operating in an individual economy are regulated by different national 
authorities, it may not be feasible to manage the domestic housing market merely by 
better financial regulation. In the case of Ireland, even if the domestic regulator had 
acted sensibly, limiting the exposure of the domestic financial system to the domestic 
housing market, this would not have prevented foreign owned banks from providing 
excessive credit. The only comprehensive instrument available to the government was 
fiscal policy. 
                                                 
 
19 63 banks failed in the region in 1985 and 69 in 1986, Keeton and Hecht, 1987. 
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Outside the Euro area, in particular in Poland and Hungary (see EFN, 2006), the 
potential risks to the economy from a housing boom are being enhanced through the 
move to borrowing in euros or Swiss francs. Such borrowing by households in foreign 
currencies was previously a factor in the financial crisis in Scandinavia in the early 
1990s (Jonung, Kiander and Vartia, 2008). This pattern of behaviour makes these 
economies vulnerable to exchange rate shocks and it could also see the costs to the 
economy of a normal adjustment process after a macro-economic shock, involving 
changes in exchange rates, being greatly magnified through the direct effects on the 
net asset position of households. 
The experience of the past, both in the US and in Europe, indicates that there is a 
little danger of a Euro-wide housing bubble posing problems for policy makers in the 
near future. However, regional booms and busts can and are happening and past 
experience indicates that they have serious implications for the regional economies so 
affected. In addition, problems in the housing market can affect the regional financial 
sector where problems of bad debts occur. This emphasises the need for the 
authorities in individual EU member states to use fiscal policy actively to prevent 
bubbles occurring. They also need to improve their regulation of their domestic 
financial systems to discourage banks from taking excessive risk which endangers the 
economy as a whole as well, of course, as the individual banks’ well-being. 
7. Conclusions 
 
Prior to EMU member states had the opportunity to manage the domestic housing 
market through monetary policy. However, under EMU monetary policy is targeted at 
the Euro area inflation rate and, because of the idiosyncratic nature of the housing 
sector across the Euro zone, the stance of monetary policy will only help control 
housing bubbles by accident. 
Under these circumstances the best instrument available to governments to manage 
regional housing markets is fiscal policy. Through suitably targeted tax instruments 
the authorities can change the cost of housing services faced by households, 
influencing their investment behaviour. Using this instrument effectively may prove 
politically difficult, partly because of its novelty. However, as housing bubbles are as 
likely to happen in the future as in the past, it will be important for governments to 
develop an understanding of the potential dangers of shocks in the housing sector to 
33 
 
the wider economy and of the implications of EMU for how the housing market must 
be managed. 
In addition, the advent of monetary union has not absolved governments from the 
duty to manage domestic inflationary pressures using fiscal policy. Instead of 
focusing on the SGP target of “not running a deficit” it may instead be appropriate for 
some countries to run substantial surpluses for a period of years. 
A second important implication for policy is the need for the regulatory authorities 
to take appropriate measures to safeguard their domestic financial sectors. In stress 
testing the financial system they need to take account of the likelihood that macro-
economic shocks may affect all economies within the EMU. Such shocks, whether or 
not they are combined, with a rise in real interest rates, may seriously affect the 
housing sector. While shocks to the housing sector are most unlikely to be generalised 
across the Euro area, they may affect a number of regional economies simultaneously, 
such as in Scandinavia in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Under these circumstances 
the robustness of individual bank’s loan portfolios needs to be tested by shocks which 
might simultaneously affect a number of the markets in which the individual banks 
trade. 
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Appendix 1 
 (1). Inverted demand equation for new house prices: Ireland 
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(2). Inverted demand equation for new house prices: Spain 
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Dependent variable:  Log (real new house prices) 
Ireland 
(1974 – 2006) 
Spain 
(1978 - 2005) 
Variables in model: Description: Coefficients: t-statistic  Coefficients: t-statistic  
C Intercept 8.41 56.78 -6.71 -2.51 
LOG(Y) Log (Income per capita) 0.99 6.56 1.13 2.54 
LOG(HSTOCK) 
Log (housing stock per 
capita) -3.79 -2.67 -8.22 -3.73 
POP2534 Household formation ratio 14.12 6.96 25.61 2.93 
LOG(rr) User cost lagged one year -0.97 -4.33 -0.85 -5.23 
D87 Dummy from 1987 onwards   0.11 1.89 
D03 Dummy from 2003 onwards 0.11 3.16 0.27 5.08 
Number of observations 33 28 
R2 0.99 0.99 
Adjusted R2 0.99 0.98 
 Test statistic: Test statistic: 
S.E. of regression 0.04 0.05 
Sum squared resid 0.05 0.06 
Log likelihood 60.41 47.43 
F-statistic 503.08 239.78 
S.D. dependent var 0.38 0.38 
Akaike info criterion -3.30 -2.89 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.26 1.53 
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